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NOTES AND COMMENTS
property was held results in the payor's receiving-as in the above
illustrations-the benefit of his payment. Therefore, it would seem
that equity would require that the nature of the security ownership,
rather than the nature of the obligation, be the controlling factor and
that contribution should not be allowed.
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
Sales-Implied Warranty of Title-When Cause of Action
for Breach Accrues after Purchase'of Precarious Title
In the recent case of Henry Vann Co. v. Barefoot,1 plaintiff and de-
fendants traded motor vehicles. Defendants' automobile had previously
been used for illegal transportation of whiskey, and after the trade it was
confiscated by federal agents. Plaintiff sued for the reasonable value
of the vehicle it had traded to the defendants on the ground of total
failure of consideration. Held, plaintiff had stated a cause of action
for breach of an implied warranty of title, but that in order to recover
it must prove that by legal proceedings the defendants' title to the
vehicle was divested as of a time prior to the trade.
The Supreme Court, reversing the court below, held, inter alia,
that plaintiff need not prove the offense which made the car subject to
confiscation. Accordingly, there is left open the question whether if the
offense prior to the trade had been proved, but not that the title of
defendants had been divested by legal proceedings, plaintiff could have
recovered. This necessarily depends on the answer to the following
question: If the vendor has committed some act or knows of circum-
stances which make his title precarious, 2 and he fails to inform his
purchaser of this fact, may the purchaser immediately sue him for breach
of an implied warranty of title, or must he wait until he has been dis-
possessed?3 In attempting to answer the hypothetical question posed,
it is necessary to consider the scope of an implied warranty of title, and
what constitutes a breach thereof.
Implied warranty of title is a well established doctrine in the United
States. The seller of personal property is held to warrant impliedly
'249 N.C. 22, 105 S.E.2d 104 (1958).
' The principle of transfer of a precarious title may be illustrated by this
anecdote: John owes Robert ten dollars. John and Robert are riding together
on a train. It is held up. The robbers are coming down the aisle of the car
relieving the passengers of their purses. Just before the robbers get to them
John hands Robert a bill and says, "Here is the ten dollars I owe you."
'It should be noted at this point that fraud of the seller inducing the sale of
personal property may entitle the purchaser to rescind the contract and re-
cover the consideration he has paid, even though the paramount title holder
has not recovered the property nor the vendee suffered any actual damages.
Case v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840). However, the difficulties of
proof presented by this remedy would make it highly desirable from the buyer's
point of view to be able to sue for breach of the implied warranty of title.
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the title unless a contrary intention appears. 4 An implied warranty of
title is, in substance, a warranty that the seller's title is perfect and free
from all liens and incumbrances or partial defects.5 Thus, where at
the time of the sale the chattels were subject to forfeiture to the federal
government for the illegal acts of the seller in violation of the revenue
laws, the subsequent enforcement of such forfeiture has been held a
breach of the seller's warranty of title.6 This holding makes it apparent
that the scope accorded the implied warranty of title covers the situation
where the vendor knowingly and without disclosure has passed to the
purchaser a precarious title later divested.
The question still remains as to when the cause of action arises for
the breach of the implied warranty. A majority of the jurisdictions, in-
cluding North Carolina, which have not adopted the Uniform Sales Act
treat the warranty of title implied in every sale as similar to a covenant
for quiet enjoyment, which goes to the possession rather than the title.
It is not deemed broken for the purpose of an action on the breach until
there has been an actual or constructive eviction of the purchaser by the
paramount title holder. 7 "The seller is bound to protect the buyer from
all evictions arising from circumstances anterior to the sale." Thus
in North Carolina an eviction is a condition precedent to the bringing
of an action for breach of an implied warranty of title.9 Under this rule
it is manifest that the purchaser of a precarious title cannot maintain
such action until his possession has been disturbed in some way by the
paramount title holder.
A minority of the courts have held that there is an immediate breach
of the implied warranty of title arising at the time of the sale, reasoning
that the implied warranty of title to chattels is analogous to a covenant
of seisin in a deed which is broken, if at all, immediately upon the de-
livery of the deed.10 Thus, courts using this analogy have held that the
breach occurred at the time of the sale. The result was that sometimes
a purchaser lost both the purchase price and the goods because the
statute of limitations had run before claim was made by the paramount
title holder." Fear of this possibility is apparently responsible for
'1 WILLISTON, SALES § 218 (rev. ed. 1948).
M'irtin v. McDonald, 168 N.C. 232, 84 S.E. 258 (1915) ; see also 1 WILLISTON,
SALES § 218 (rev. ed. 1948).
'McKnight v. Devlin, 52 N.Y. 399 (1873); Henry Vann Co. v. Barefoot, 249
N.C. 22, 105 S.E.2d 104 (1958).
7 Roberts v. Hill, 78 Ga. App. 264, 50 S.E.2d 706 (1948) ; Hodges v. Wilkinson,
111 N.C. 56, 15 S.E. 941 (1892); Wilson v. Tihcheff, 196 Okl. 243, 164 P.2d 396(1945) ; see also 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (rev. ed. 1948).
8 Myers v. Smith, 27 Md. 91, 110 (1867).
'Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N.C. 56, 15 S.E. 941 (1892).
"oChancellor v. Wiggins, 4 Ky. (B. Mon.) 202, 39 Am. Dec. 499 (1843);
Spillane v. Corey, 323 Mass. 673, 84 N.E.2d 5 (1949) ; Perkins v. Whelan, 116
Mass. 542 (1874) ; see also 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (rev. ed. 1948).
1 Chancellor v. Wiggins, supra note 9; Perkins v. Whelan, supra note 9.
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insistence by the majority, including North Carolina, on eviction as a
prerequisite to recovery.' 2  Actually, neither rule adequately protects
the purchaser. Under the majority rule he is denied any recourse against
his vendor until he has been evicted, and under the minority rule he
runs the risk of having his rights barred by the statute of limitations.
Under the Uniform Sales Act there is an implied warranty on the
part of the seller that he has the right to sell the goods, and there is a
further implied warranty that the buyer should have and enjoy quiet
possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time
of the sale.' 3 The first warranty has been held to be separate and inde-
pendent from the operation of the second one.' 4 Thus, where the
vendor at the time of the sale had in fact no title to the goods and there-
fore no right to sell them, the purchaser was given the right to proceed
immediately against him even though there had been no eviction.' 5 It
would appear that the same result should follow in the case where the
vendor had a precarious title to the goods. Apparently the Sales Act
contemplates an implied warranty that the seller has the right to sell a
good, clean title which is certainly something more than a precarious
title. Thus under the Sales Act it could be argued that a purchaser of
a precarious title without notice could sue his vendor immediately for
breach of his implied warranty that he had the right to sell the goods
notwithstanding the fact that there had been no eviction. If there is a
breach of warranty by the seller, the Uniform Sales Act authorizes the
buyer at his election to rescind the sale, offer to return the goods to
the seller, and recover any part of the purchase price which has been
paid.' 6 Thus, apparently the purchaser of a precarious title would be
able to recover the purchase price even though there had been no eviction.
However, since the breach necessarily arises at the time of the sale, the
statute of limitations may have run before the purchaser discovers the
defect in his title. In such case, the purchaser would have to rely upon
the implied warranty of quiet enjoyment, and would encounter the same
obstacle under the Uniform Sales Act that he would under the North
Carolina rule-namely, the requirement of an eviction before he may
sue for the breach.
It is submitted that the purchaser of a precarious title should be
allowed to sue on his warranty as soon as he discovers the nature of his
title regardless of whether a claim has been asserted by a superior title
holder. A purchaser is placed in a most undesirable position when he is
denied the right to sue before eviction. The effect of such denial is to
"2 Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. 111 (1871) ; see also 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221
(rev. ed. 1948).
' Uniform Sales Act § 13.14Martin v. Coffman, 87 Ohio App. 398, 95 N.E.2d 286 (1949).
5 Ibid.
"' Uniform Sales Act § 69.
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allow a vendor, who knows that he is going to lose or runs great risk of
losing his goods, to pass this risk on to an innocent purchaser who must
bear it until claim is asserted by the paramount title holder. To allow
a vendor to pass on to an unknowing purchaser goods which he deems
"too hot to handle" is unconscionable, and a remedy should be available
at once. If plaintiff's right to recover the purchase price is delayed,17
the dangers of the defendant disappearing or becoming judgment proof
in the interim are imminent. Justice demands that he be given a remedy
to recover the purchase price immediately upon discovering such fact."
The effect of allowing the purchaser to sue on his warranty at this time
would be to afford him the adequate protection he needs against such
bargains and in so doing would not subject him to the danger of having
his action barred by the statute of limitations before he discovers the
defect. The vendor would not be prejudiced by such action as he is
protected against any false assertions made by the purchaser by the
requirement that the purchaser must prove in his action the actual
existence of a superior claim to the goods.19
The North Carolina Legislature might well consider abolishing the
doctrine that an implied warranty of title is the equivalent of a covenant
of quiet enjoyment. Disturbance of possession should not be the ex-
clusive way in which breach of the warranty can be established. This
appears to be the view adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code. 20 A
comment on the applicable subsection states that it
makes provision for a buyer's basic needs in respect to a title
which he in good faith expects to acquire by his purchase, namely,
that he receive a good, clean title transferred to him also in a
rightful manner so that he will not be exposed to a lawsuit in
order to protect it.
7. The plaintiff in suing for breach of warranty would more than likely seek
rescission as his remedy rather than damages. "Logically his recovery, if his
action is tried before he has been evicted, should be based on the chance of his
being subsequently deprived of the benefit of what he has bought. Such a measure
of damage is, however, so speculative as to be difficult of practical application."
1 WLLisToN, SALES § 221 (rev. ed. 1948).
"s A buyer has been held entitled to rescind on the ground of mutual mistake
when ties sold were, without the knowledge of either party, in danger of destruc-
tion by forest fire at the time of the sale. Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219
Mich. 643, 189 N.W. 923 (1922). If mutual mistake is a ground for rescission
when the existence of the goods is precarious, breach of warranty of title should
be a ground when the title is precarious.
"Jordan v. Van Duzee, 139 Minn. 103, 165 N.W. 877 (1917); Martin v.
Coffman, 87 Ohio App. 398, 95 N.E.2d 286 (1949).2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-312. Warranty of Title and Against In-
fringement; Buyer's Obligation Against Infringement.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty that
(a) The title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other
lien or incumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has
no knowledge.
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The warranty of quiet possession is abolished. Disturbance
of quiet possession, although not mentioned specifically, is one
way, among many, in which the breach of the warranty of title
may be established.
The view advocated in this note, that the warranty of title is violated
when the title conveyed is unsound although the buyer is not yet dis-
turbed by adverse claimants, is adopted in the Code in connection with
a particular situation. The Code specifies that "a seller who is a
merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of
infringement or the like. ... "21 A comment states that "this section
rejects the cases which recognize the principle that infringements violate
the warranty of title, but deny the buyer a remedy unless he has been
expressly prevented from using the goods. Under this Article 'eviction'
is not a necessary condition to the buyer's remedy since the buyer's
remedy arises immediately upon receipt of notice of infringement; it is
mrely one way of establishing the fact of breach." If this be sound law
as to merchants when a title is invalid by reason. of infringements, it
would appear to be sound law generally where the title is invalid by
reason of other infirmities.
BAILEY PATRICK, JR.
Taxation-Depreciation-Useful Life, Salvage Value and. Capital
Gains Under the Declining Amount Depreciation Methods of the
1954 Code
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 authorizes taxpayers in business
to compute a reasonable allowance for depreciation by means of liberal-
ized, declining amount methods in addition to the ordinary straight line
method.1 However, section 167(c) expressly provides that these liberal-
ized methods "shall apply only in the case of property (other than
intangible property) ...with a useful life of 3 years or more .
(Emphasis added.) 2
21 UN FoRm COmmERCiAL CODE § 2-312 (3).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167. Section 167(b) provides:
For taxable years ending after December 31, 1953, the term "reasonable
allowance" as used in subsection (a) shall include (but shall not be limited to)
an allowance computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary or his delegate, under any of the following methods:
/ 1 the straight line method,
2) the declining balance method, using a rate not exceeding twice the
rate which would have been used had the annual allowance been computed
under the method described in paragraph (1),
(3) the sum of the years-digits method, and
(4) any other consistent method productive of an annual allowance. . .
Section 167(c) has other limitations on the use of the liberalized methods
of depreciation, not pertinent to this Note, which in effect require that such
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